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Muko and Conex: The Third Circuit
Responds to Connell

ROBERT A. KING*
MELVIN L. MOSER**

The authors discuss the application of federal antitrust laws to organized labor. The article, writtenfor practioners,defines the elements necessary to obtain a recovery in labor antitrust actions. The authors analyze
the standardof review, burden of proof and the elements which the unions
must show in order to be exempted from antitrust law. The focal point of
the article is the comparison between the Supreme Court's most recent discussion of the labor exemption in Connell Construction Co. v. Plummers &
Steamfitters Local Union 100 and the Third Circuit's application of that
exemption in Larry V. Muko v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Building
Trades Council and ConsolidatedExpress, Inc., v. N.Y. Shipping Association.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The interaction of federal labor and antitrust policies has long
proved to be a troubling area. Combining express statutory provisions' with a judicial gloss on those legislative terms has created
uncertainty regarding the extent to which union activities, particularly those in cooperation with non-union groups, 2 are within the
purview of federal antitrust law. Practitioners delving into this
amorphous and conceptually difficult area are faced with a myriad
* A.B., Colgate University, 1969; J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1972; Partner,
Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle & Buerger, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
** B.S., University of Pittsburgh, 1971; J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1976.
1. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 151, 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976); Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-170
(1976); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
2. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975), reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1976). See also UMWA v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).

of unanswered questions as they attempt to resolve holdings and
concepts that are, in a sense, irreconcilable. 3 It is the purpose of
this article to identify and respond to some of these questions, the
most important of which concerns what must be proved in order
to obtain recovery in a labor antitrust action as well as what obstacles must be surmounted. To highlight these matters, the innovative judicial resolutions that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit developed in Larry V. Muko, Inc. v.
Southwestern Pennsylvania Building Trades Council (Muko)4
and Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Association
(Conex) 5 will be analyzed, to provide the practitioner with a
guide to getting his client's case before a jury.
II.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION TO FEDERAL

ANTITRUST LAW

The road to Muko and Conex is long and convoluted, as courts
have attempted to grapple with an antitrust policy, based on a
concededly ambiguous 6 statute that has been amended from time
to time to reflect congressional response to unfavored decisions
interpreting it.7 The Supreme Court's last decision involving the
labor exemption to antitrust laws, Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100,8 is to be appreciated, if
not for its substantive content, at least for its effort to reconcile
and capsulize a rather slippery concept which had been tradition3. That is not to say that there have not been many attempts to make this
reconciliation. See generally Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 PA. L. REV. 1094 (1962); Di Cola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 Prrr. L. REV. 705
(1972); Kryvoruka, A Paradigmof Labor-Antitrust Relations: Defining A Union's
Allowable Area of Economic Conflict, 11 AKRON L REV. 59 (1977); Moeller, Employee Rights and Antitrust Liability: Organized Labor's Exemption After Connell, 48 Miss. L. J. 713 (1977); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense
of Labor Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE
L. J. 14 (1963); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 254
(1967); Comment, Labor's Exemption from FederalAntitrust Law: The Diminishing Protectionfor Union Activity, 28 FLA. L. REV. 620 (1967).
4. 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979).
5. 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded,48 U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980).
6. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) and Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Each interprets the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 et seq. (1976).
7. Clayton Act, § 7 ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)), was a congressional response to the Danbury Hatters decision, Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 272 (1908). See Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 67-68; Moeller, supra
note 3, at 715 (1977). See also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976) as
a congressional response to unfavored court decisions.
8. 431 U.S. 616 (1975), reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1976). See St. Antoine, supra
note 3, at 62; Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented
Supreme Court Term--1977, 77 CoLIurI. L. REV. 979 (1977).
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ally used to circumvent the aims of those very laws. 9
A.

The Early History

Federal statutory antitrust law may be traced to its origins in
the Sherman Act of 1890.10 Aimed at eliminating the evils that
monopolies and trade restraints had visited on society," the Act
was nevertheless utilized as a tool by which a growing trade
union movement could be controlled. In the infamous Danbury
Hatters12 case, the Court made it clear that labor unions were not
beyond the purview of the Sherman Act when their activity was
aimed at commerce. The decision also demonstrated that direct
restraints of trade effected by the use of secondary boycotts of
goods, in an effort to gain unionization, would create antitrust lia13
bility.
Congress responded in 1914 with passage of the Clayton Act,
which by definition removed the "labor of a human being" from
articles or commodities of commerce14 and limited the ability of
the federal courts to grant injunctive relief in relation to labor disputes.15 The labor euphoria that accompanied this legislative re9. See Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). See generally
UMWA v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
11. See Moeller, supra note 3, at 714 n.14.
12. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). The case derived its popular name
from the fact that the activity in question involved a boycott of non-union hats.
13. See Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 66.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 17 provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 52 provides:
No restraining order or injuction shall be granted by any court of the
United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an
employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury
to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for
which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or
property right must be described with particularity in the application,
which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or
attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or

sponse was short-lived. The Court promptly limited the antiinjunction section to disputes between employees and immediate
employers. Thus, the Court interpreted these provisions in a
manner so as to sap their vitality.16
Eleven years later, Congress again legislated to restrict the
availability of the injunction weapon in labor relations through
passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 7 This Act restrained injunctions growing out of labor disputes and began to articulate a
persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of
employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or
from attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain
from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ a party to such
dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding
from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other
moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might
lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor
shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to
be violations of any law of the United States.
16. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), the Court limited the anti-injuction section to disputes between employees and their immediate
employers, and indicated that since 15 U.S.C. § 17 was limited to "lawful" activities, secondary activity was still included in the antitrust examination. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutter's Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). The operative provision is § 104, which provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of
any employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise
as is described in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or
insurance, or her moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in
any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any
action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other
method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of
their interests in a labor dispute
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the
acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise cuasing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking
or promise as is described in section 103 of this title.
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sweeping national policy that would foster continued development of collective employee activity.18 The Supreme Court's initial pronouncement relating these clear statements of
congressional displeasure with its prior holdings to antitrust law
came in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.19 In Apex, Justice Stone
enunciated a view of the reach of antitrust policy that reflected on
the purpose underlying the Sherman Act and found that only
union activity which directly restrained commercial activity was
within the Act's concern. 20 To accommodate the legitimate labor
concerns with the Sherman Act, the Court would only be concerned with "prevention of restraints to free competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict
production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the
detriment of purchasers or consumers."' 21 Thus, Apex served to
remove from antitrust consideration those union activities which
restrained the labor market, but did not restrain commercial activity.
The next link in the exemption chain came in United States v.
Hutcheson,22 in which Justice Frankfurter announced a "harmonizing" approach to labor antitrust analysis. 23 Described as a tour
de force,24 the Court broadly outlined an exemption from antitrust liability. This exemption was produced by an integrated
reading of the anti-injunction provisions of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. The Court indicated that there would be no
criminal prosecution for activity which the courts could not enjoin
and summarized the scope of a union's protected activity stating:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with nonlabor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished
by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
18. The National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1935) (subsequently declared unconstitutional, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935)) and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-170 (1976),
each were dramatic steps in the development of American labor relations law.
They represent congressional recognition of the value of collective employee activity.
19. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
20. Id. at 491-94, 502-11. See Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 70.
21. 310 U.S. at 493. Justice Stone indicates that concerted union activity will
often have significant effect on competition, but that such effect will not bring the
activities within the Sherman Act, id. at 503. See generally Coronado Coal Co. v.
UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) and UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
22. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). See L. SuL.ivAN, ANrrrRuST § 237 (1977).
23. 312 U.S. at 231. See Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. and
Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1378 (3d Cir. 1979) (Aldisert, J. dissenting).
24. See St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 607.

wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means. There is nothing remotely within the
terms of § 20 that differentiates between trade union conduct directed
against an employer because of a controversy arising in the relation between employer and employee, as such, and conduct similarly directed
struggle between two unions seeking
but ultimately due to an internecine
25
the favor of the same employer.

The result of Hutcheson was to provide antitrust immunity for labor activity in the course of a labor dispute taken to further only
the interests of the union and not in combination with a non-labor
group.
Then, the situation posited to fall outside this exemption came
before the Court in Allen Bradley v. IBEW Local 3.26 In Allen
Bradley, an electrical workers union combined with electrical
equipment manufacturers and contractors to effectively isolate
the New York City area from competition by parties who were not
signatories to the union agreement. 2 7 With Allen Bradley, the
Court seemed to complete the initial development of a labor antitrust relationship which allowed for labor immunity, so long as a
union did not combine with non-labor groups, and avoided impos28
ing direct restraints outside of the labor market.
The Hutcheson exemption has come to be known as labor's
"statutory" 29 exemption to antitrust liability, as its origin is in direct legislative proscription of judicial interference with collective
employee action. Parallel to this is a "non-statutory" exemption,
based on the need to reconcile antitrust policy with a desire to
30
favor association of employees to eliminate wage competition.
Even this judicially created exemption, however, has its basis in
congressional action which serves as the basis of the national labor policy. 3 1 This exemption is utilized when employee groups
25. 312 U.S. at 232.
26. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
27. This agreement had the effect of preventing the sale of equipment manufactured outside of New York City to contractors, increasing wages of electricians
in the city, driving up prices for equipment in the city, and increasing profits for
manufacturers and contractors. The agreement required contractors to buy only
from local manufacturers; manufacturers could sell locally only to contractors using Local members. The agreement also required contractors and manufacturers
to maintain closed shops with only Local members being employed. 325 U.S. at
799. See Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 74.
28. See At. Antoine, supra note 3, at 608.
29. For a succinct description of the historical distinctions between the "statutory" and "non-statutory" exemptions, see Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v. Wm.Morris
Agency, 411 F. Supp. 403, 406-08 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
30. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965)
(White, J.).
31. See notes 24 and 25 supra. The choice of "statutory exemption" may be
inaccurate, but it does provide a shorthand method of differentiating Hutchesontype exemptions from those resulting from judicial balancing. See Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (White, J.). But see 381 U.S.
at 697 (Goldberg, J., dissenting and concurring).
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join with non-labor parties, outside the Hutcheson standard, to
enter into agreements which tend to eliminate a competitive advantage based solely on wage differentials. The contours of this
exemption from antitrust scrutiny were outlined in Connell, in
which the Court stated:
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages
and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers,
but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on
business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws. The
Court therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for
the lessening of business competition based on differences in wages and
working conditions. Labor policy clearly does not require, however, that a
union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among
those who employ its members. Thus, while the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some restaints by acting unilaterally, the nonstatutory exemption offers no similar protection when a union 3and
a non2
labor party agree to restrain competition in a business market.

B.

Pre-ConnellDevelopment

The Court seemed to foreshadow this conclusion in the com33
panion cases of United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington
34
and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. In each case, a
fragmented 35 Court attempted to add further definition to this
non-statutory exemption for joint union-employer activity.
The Pennington case concerned a national agreement entered
into by the United Mine Workers and large coal concerns. The
antitrust complaint alleged that the agreement was an effort to
force smaller coal operators out of the market by agreeing on
wage schedules beyond their capability. The gist of the agreement was a trade-off whereby the union would receive higher
wages in return for not opposing large company development of
automated operations. The union defended on grounds that it
was exempt from antitrust coverage. The union claimed that
since the agreement centered on wages, the agreement was
32. 421 U.s. at 622.
33. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
34. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
35. In Pennington, Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, he was
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark. Justices
Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart concurred in the result only. In Jewel Tea, Justices
White, Warren, and Brennan constituted the plurality, with Justices Goldberg,
Harlan, and Stewart concurring in the result. Justices Black and Clark concurred
in a dissent by Justice Douglas.

within the policy announced in Apex Hosiery36 which allowed
union activity if that activity was concerned with such union interests as wages and did not restrain commercial activity.
The Court rejected the claimed exemption on multiple grounds.
It noted that had the union become party to a collusive arrangement to remove small operators from the market, an exemption
claim would be frivolous. 37 Further, and more importantly, the
plurality indicated that an exemption is not automatically available because the agreement involved a mandatory bargaining
subject.3 8 The Court summarized the relationship between multiple-employer bargaining, wage negotiation, and antitrust exemption when it stated:
[T] here are limits to what a union or an employer may offer or extract in
the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not mean that
the agreement reached may disregard other laws.
We have said that a union may make wage agreements with a multi-employer bargaining unit and may in pursuance of its own union interests
seek to obtain the same terms from other employers. No case under the
antitrust laws could be made out on evidence limited to such union behavior. But we think a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws
when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to
impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units. One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and
the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy. This is true even though the union's part in the scheme is an undertaking to secure the same wages, hours or other3 9conditions of employment
from the remaining employers in the industry.

Thus, Pennington paralleled Hutcheson: a union may act unilaterally in a manner that will result in driving some employers from
business, but once combined with a non-labor group, the union
0
loses its exempt status when the same end result is reached.4
36. 381 U.S. at 664. See Moeller, supra note 3, at 720.
37. 381 U.S. at 663.
38. Id. at 664-65; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
39. 381 U.S. at 665-66.
40. See Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 78. The notion that "predatory intent" is
required to lose the exemption is undercut in Pennington, where Justice White
stated:
On the other hand, the policy of the antitrust laws is clearly set against
employer-union agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards outside
the bargaining unit. One could hardly contend, for example, that one
group of employers could lawfully demand that the union impose on other
employers wages that were significantly higher than those paid by the requesting employers, or a system of computing wages that, because of differences in methods of production, would be more costly to one set of
employers than to another. The anticompetitive potential of such a combination is obvious, but is little more severe than what is alleged to have
been the purpose and effect of the conspriacy in this case to establish
wages at a level that marginal producers could not pay so that they would
be driven from the industry. And if the conspiracy presently under attack
were declared exempt it would hardly be possible to deny exemption to
such avowedly discriminatory schemes.
From the viewpoint of antitrustpolicy, moreover, all such agreements be.
tween a group of employers and a union that the union will seek specified
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4
Pennington was reaffirmed in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers '
wherein the Court stated: "[w]here a union, by agreement with
one set of employers, insists on maintaining in other bargaining
units specified wage standards ruinous to the business of those
employers, it is liable under the antitrust laws for the damages
caused by its agreed-upon conduct."4 2
In Jewel Tea, the Court was again faced with juggling the competing policies of labor and antitrust law. There, Chicago
meatcutters and butchers entered an agreement whereby meat
sales were restricted to the hours of 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. The
Jewel Tea Company reluctantly agreed to this provision, but
sought antitrust action to enjoin its enforcement, alleging that
this agreement was a conspiracy which prevented marketing on
its own terms. The Court upheld the agreement as being within
the non-statutory labor exemption, as there was no showing that
the union was acting beyond its own labor interests, nor that it
acted at the behest of non-labor groups. 4 3 In Jewel Tea, the restriction on marketing hours was "so intimately related to wages,
hours and working conditions," that the reconciliation of national
labor policy and the Sherman Act tilted toward exemption.4 4 The
plurality stated that:

[wI e think that the particular hours of the day and the particular days of
the week during which employees shall be required to work are subjects
well within the realm of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
labor standards outside the bargainingunit suffer from a more basic defect, without regard to predatory intention or effect in the particularcase.
For the salient characteristic of such agreements is that the union surrenders its freedom of action with respect to its bargaining policy. Prior to
the agreement the union might seek uniform standards in its own self-interest but would be required to assess in each case the probable costs and
gains of a strike or other collective action to that end and thus might conlude that the objective of uniform standards should temporarily give way.
After the agreement the union's interest would be bound in each case to
that of the favored employer group. It is just such restraints upon the
freedom of economic units to act according to their own choice and discretion that run counter to antitrust policy.
381 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added). See also Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
41. 401 U.S. 302 (1971), remanded,344 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 481
F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973). The major concern in
Ramsey was with the evidentiary standard in Pennington-type situations where
an employer agrees with a union to set wage scales. The lower court indicated
that "clear proof" of an union-employer conspiracy was necessary. The Court reversed, holding that this higher than usual evidentiary standard applied only
when an attempt was made to hold unions vicariously liable for individual action.
See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
42. 401 U.S. at 313.
43. 381 U.S. at 688-90.
44. Id.

employment" about which employers and unions must bargain .... And,
although the effect on competition is apparent and real, perhaps more so
than in the case of the wage agreement, the concern of union members is
immediate and direct. Weighing the respective interests involved, we
think the national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations
Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees must work. An agreement
on these subjects between the union and the employers in a bargaining
unit is not illegal under the Sherman Act, nor is the union's unilateral
de45
mand for the same contract of other employers in the industry.

It should be noted, however, that the Court was not willing to
grant automatic exemption solely on the ground that an agree46
ment was centered on a mandatory bargaining subject.
After Jewel Tea, it appeared that the labor exemptions could be
classified as follows:
1.

2.
3.

4.

Labor, acting alone and not in concert with non-labor groups, was exempt from antitrust scrutiny, under the statutory exemption in Hutcheson.
Labor acting in concert with non-labor groups to effect direct product
market restraints was within antitrust scrutiny under Allen Bradley
and Apex Hosiery.
Labor agreeing with non-labor groups, even over wage scales, would be
within the scope of antitrust policy, if such agreement with one employer seeks to impose that scale on other bargaining units, under Pennington.
Agreements regarding subjects intimately related to wages, hours, and
conditions of work, made in the union's self-interest and not at an employer's urging, would be exempt, notwithstanding a real and apparent
effect on market competition. Jewel Tea.

Connell, ten years later, appears to be an attempt by the Court
to create a definitive statement of the reach of these exemptions,
and Muko and Conex serve as illustrations of the Connell standard in action.
III.
A.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION

The Connell Decision

The latest word from the Supreme Court on the scope of the labor exemption from antitrust liability came in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100.47 In Connell,
a local union sought to compel general contractors to become signatories to an agreement requiring them to use only subcontractors who were represented by Local 100.48 Upon Connell's refusal
45. Id. at 691.
46. See Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 83. Justice Goldberg would have gone further and concluded the federal labor laws were the exclusive regulatory scheme
for activity within the sphere of mandatory bargaining subjects. 381 U.S. at 709
(Goldberg, J., dissenting and concurring).
47. 421 U.S. 616 (1974), reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
48. Id. at 618-19. The agreement provided:
"WHEREAS, the contractor and the union are engaged in the construction industry, and
"WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agreement
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to enter into such an agreement, the union posted a single picket
at one of Connell's larger construction sites. This resulted in a
halt to construction work at that site, as approximately 150 workers walked off the job. 49 Connell then signed the agreement
under protest.o The district court had upheld this subcontracting
agreement as being exempt from federal antitrust law by virtue of
its legality under section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act.51 The court of appeals affirmed,5 2 holding that the union's
goal of organizing subcontractors5 3 was a legitimate labor interest,
and its actions in realizing that goal were exempt from federal antitrust proscription.
In reversing the holding as to antitrust immunity, 54 the Connell
majority 55 focused on the effect of this agreement between a
applying in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8(e) of
the Labor-Management Relations Act;
"WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor
does not grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bargaining representative of any employees of the signatory contractor; and
"WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limitation
provided herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor
does not perform with his own employees but uniformly subcontracts to
other firms;
"THEREFORE, the contractor and the union mutually agree with respect to work falling within the scope of this agreement that is to be done
at the site of construction, alternation, painting or repair of any building,
structure, or other works, that [if] the contractor should contract or subcontract any of the aforesaid work falling within the normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or subcontract such work
only to firms that are parties to an executed, current collective bargaining
agreement with Local Union 100 of the United Association of Journeymen
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefltting Industry."
Id. at 619-20.
49. Id. at 620.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 621. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-170 (1976). The district court also held that
state antitrust law was preempted by federal labor legislation. This holding was
affirmed by the court of appeals, 483 F.2d 1154, 1175 (5th Cir. 1973), and by the
Supreme Court, 421 U.S. at 621, 637.
52. 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 1167, 1169. Justice Powell agreed that this was the union's goal, stating, "the union's sole objective was to compel the general contractors to agree that
in letting subcontracts for mechanical work they would deal only with firms that
were parties to the union's current collective-bargaining agreement." 421 U.S. at
618-19. This is critical when one considers the weight given the union's motivation
when the court considered the protection granted to the construction-industry
subcontracting agreements by § 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). See notes
62-65 infra and accompanying text.
54. 421 U.S. at 621.
55. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Powell, with whom
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined. Justice

union and a non-labor group on competition in the business market. The Court also focused on the significance of agreements between labor groups and non-labor parties outside of the collective
bargaining process.
The Court observed that national labor policy favors reduction
in competition over wages and working conditions and this national policy serves as the foundation for the non-statutory labor
exemption.5 6 Connell, however, presented a broader restraining
effect on union activity. The subcontracting agreements with Local 100 not only prohibited agreements with subcontractors who
were non-union and were presumably paying less than union
scale, but prevented the use of any subcontractor, union or nonunion, that did not have an agreement with Local 100.57 This
agreement resulted in the union having complete and unilateral
control over subcontractor work with signatory general contractors. By restricting the number of collective agreements it entered into with subcontractors, the union could limit the number
of subcontracting firms available to signatory general contrac58
tors.
Douglas dissented separately, and joined with Justices Brennan and Marshall in a
dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart.
56. Justice Powell noted:
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages
and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect the price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this
effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.
The Court therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on differences in
wages and working conditions.. . . Labor policy clearly does not require,
however, that a union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those who employ its members.
421 U.S. at 622 (citation omitted).
57. 421 U.S. at 623-24.
58. As the Court stated:
Success in exacting agreements from general contractors would also
give Local 100 power to control access to the market for mechanical subcontracting work. The agreements with general contractors did not simply
prohibit subcontracting to any firm that did not have a contract with Local
100. The union thus had complete control over subcontract work offered
by general contractors that had signed these agreements. Such control
could result in significant adverse effects on the market and on consumers-effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing workers and standardizing working conditions. For example, if the union
thought the interests of its members would be served by having fewer
subcontractors competing for the available work, it could refuse to sign
collective-bargaining agreements with marginal firms.... Or, since Local
100 has a well-defined geographical jurisdiction, it could exclude "traveling" subcontractors by refusing to deal with them. Local 100 thus might
be able to create a geographical enclave for local contractors, similar to
the closed market in Allen Bradley....
421 U.S. at 624-25 (citations omitted).
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This broad ability to expand and contract the range of choices
open to general contractors resulted in potential antitrust liability
for two reasons. First, the effect of the restrictive subcontracting
agreement was beyond limiting competition based on wage rates.
It effectively eliminated from the market those non-union subcontractors whose competitive advantage arose from efficiency of op59
eration rather than sub-standard wages and working conditions.
Second, the non-statutory antitrust exemption has its basis in the
reconciliation of two pre-eminent federal policies, that of market
competition as embodied in the antitrust laws, and that of collective employee action. When the goals of the labor policy are only
minimally furthered, if at all, by granting an antitrust exemption,
this reconciliation is not required, and the full range of statutory
antitrust liability will attach. In Connell, the Court found that the
agreement to organize the subcontractors was lawful, but the
Court focused on the fact that the means of achieving that goal
were beyond the scope of the labor policy. The Court reasoned
that the restraint on the business market did not follow naturally
from the legitimate elimination of competition over wages and
working conditions. 60 Hence, as exemption from antitrust liability
would not serve to further the national labor policy, Local 100's
activities would be subject to antitrust scrutiny. The Court, in
dicta, further indicated that the inclusion of a restraint of this degree in a legal collective bargaining agreement would not save the
exemption since the reach of a provision such as this went beyond that necessary to preserve valid objectives of reducing com59. The Court noted this effect of a Connell-type agreement:
In this case Local 100 used direct restraints on the business market to
support its organizing campaign. The agreements with Connell and other
general contractors indiscriminately excluded nonunion subcontractors
from a portion of the market, even if their competitive advantages were
not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather
from more efficient operating methods. Curtailment of competition based
on efficiency is neither a goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary effect
among workers of the elimination of competition. Moreover, competition
based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws strive to protect.
421 U.S. at 623.
This raises the question of whether or not the employer, who derives a competitive advantage by a means other than disparate wages and conditions, may use
that as a defense to what otherwise would be an agreement within the labor antitrust exemption. This defense could also serve to preclude a union's showing that
its agreement is "intimately" concerned with wages and conditions of employment
under Jewel Tea.
60. 421 U.S. at 635. The Court felt that the organization of subcontractors was
a legitimate goal of labor unions.

petition over wages and working conditions. 61
The lower courts in Connell each resolved the question of antitrust immunity on the basis that section 8(e) of National Labor
Relations Act explicitly allowed this type of agreement, and
hence, antitrust policy must defer to clearly pronounced labor law
considerations. 62 The Supreme Court rejected this analysis. The
Court noted that section 8(e) exempted construction sites from
its provisions. The Court then found that the intended effect of
8(e)'s construction proviso was not served by the agreement in
Connell. The elimination of jobsite friction between union and
non-union employees was not presented as a justification for the
subcontracting agreement. 63 The Court effectively limited the
scope of section 8(e) to collective bargaining situations and to
those common-situs relationships on particular jobsites which are
unique to the close community of interests in the construction industry.64 Finally, the Connell majority dismissed a claim that, regardless of the legality under section 8(e) of this type of
subcontracting agreement, remedies under the National Labor
61. 421 U.S. at 625-26. This may be a further definition of a concept that
seemed to underpin Justice White's opinion in Jewel Tea, that even an agreement
which concerns areas within the legitimate sphere of union interest must be no
broader than necessary to protect those interests. See Consolidated Express, Inc.
v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n., 602 F.2d 494, 517 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 48
U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980) (Conex).
62. 421 U.S. at 626. Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of
the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided,That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organizaton and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a
building, structure, or other work: Providedfurther,That for the purposes
of this subsection and subsection (b) (4) (B) of this section the terms 'any
employer,' 'any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce,'; and 'any person' when used in relation to the terms 'any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer,' 'any other employer,' or 'any other
person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer,
contractor, or subcontractor working on the good or premises of the jobber
or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Providedfurther, That nothing
in this subchapter shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which
is within the foregoing exception.
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
63. 421 U.S. at 631. The Court relied on its own interpretation of section 8(e)'s
purpose as stated in National Woodwork Mfrs v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639-40 (1967),
and that of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Drivers Local 695 v.
NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
64. 421 U.S. at 633.
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65
Relations Act were exclusive.

B.

The Conex Decision

Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N. Y. Shipping Association66 involved the much litigated 67 rules on containers which regulate the
use of pre-loaded freight containers in and around the Port of
New York.68 The plaintiff, a freight consolidator, brought suit
against the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) and the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) alleging that their
enforcement of these rules constituted a group boycott of the
plaintiff in violation of the Sherman Act.69 The consolidator
sought treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act,7 0 alleging injury to its business.
NYSA is a collective bargaining agent for shippers in the Port of
65. Id. at 634.
66. 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 48 U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980)
(Conex). Also named as defendants in the action were the following: Sea-Land
Services, Inc., Seatrain Lines, Inc., International Longshoreman's Association,
AFL-CIO, International Terminal Operating Co., Inc., John M. McGrath Corp., Pittston Stevedoring Corp., United Terminals Corp., and Universal Maritime Services
Corp. The Court remanded Conex to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit for reconsideration in light of NLRB v. International Longshoreman's
Ass'n., 100 S.Ct. 2305 (1980). Crucial to the Third Circuit's holding in Conex was
the affirmance by the Second Circuit of a Labor Board finding that the ILA had
violated §§ 8(e) and 8(4)(B) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(e) & 158(4)(B) (1976).
The Court in International Longshoremen refused to enforce a NLRB order
against the ILA in a case litigating the propriety of the rules on containers and the
Dublin supplement. See NLRB v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n., 613 F.2d
890 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 727 (1980). The Court noted that this
refusal to enforce the NLRB order was contrary to the result reached by the Second Circuit in International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977), reh. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977). Thus, there
was a need to remand the Conex case to the Third Circuit for reconsideration.
67. See International Longshoreman's Ass'n. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 439 (1st Cir.
1977); Humphrey v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n., 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.
1977); International Longshoreman's Ass'n. v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977), reh. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Intercontinental
Container Transp. Corp. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n., 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970).
68. For a concise statement of the enforcement and scope of these rules, see
602 F.2d at 498.
69. 602 F.2d at 511.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976):
That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

New York and as such, has an agreement with the ILA.71 The
rules on containers and the Dublin supplement are part of that
agreement and serve to regulate the pre-dockside "stuffing" of
containers for use on container cargo vessels. 72 Essentially, the
rules provide that all consolidated cargo originating from or to be
shipped to a point within fifty miles of the dock must be stripped
by longshoremen at dockside. Outbound cargo was to be containerized or "stuffed" into a container, while inbound goods
would be left on the pier for pickup. The r~iles provided a monetary penalty against the employer for each container which
passed over the docks without being unloaded or "stripped" and
restuffed. By 1970, the penalty was $1,000 per violation.7 3
Shortly after effective date of the rules, a consolidator similar to
Conex brought antitrust and unfair labor practice claims against
NYSA and ILA.74 Both of these claims were rejected by the Second Circuit on the grounds of the labor exemption to the antitrust
75
laws and valid work preservation measures.
In 1973, the rules were supplemented since the ILA was concerned that they were not being effectively enforced.7 6 In an effort to tighten the control the agreement would have over the
container shipping industry, the rules were augmented to provide
that off-pier consolidators, such as Conex, operating within fifty
miles of the Port of New York would be considered to be violating
the rules. Further, moving to a point outside that zone would be
of no avail, as the supplement contained a "runaway-shop"
clause. 77 According to the new terms, vessel owners were to be
fined $1,000 for each container furnished them by a consolidator
violating the supplement. In March of 1973, several vessel owners
stopped providing Conex and another consolidator 78 with containers, and on April 13 of that year, the NYSA and ILA named Conex
as a consolidator operating in violation of the rules. This acti71. 602 F.2d at 498. For a detailed history of NYSA-ILA relations, see Justice
Marshall's discussion in NLRB v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n., 100 S.Ct.
2305 (1980).
72. 602 F.2d at 498-99.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n.,
426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970).
75. 426 F.2d at 888.
76. 602 F.2d at 499. The meeting consisted of ILA representatives and agents
of CONASA, (Council of North Atlantic Shipping Associations), an employer bargaining unit of which NYSA was a member. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 100 S. Ct. 2305, 2310 (1980).
77. This clause provided that an employer could not escapte the rules "stuffing
and stripping" requirements by relocating beyond the fifty mile limit. 602 F.2d at
499.
78. Id. The other consolidator was Twin Express, Inc., who was joined as a
plaintiff in Conex.
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vated terms of the rules which required all NYSA members to refuse to provide shipping containers to Conex. 79 This action
effectively terminated Conex's freight consolidation business in
the New York-Puerto Rico trade. 80
Conex filed unfair labor practice charges with the Labor Board,
alleging that the agreement violated section 8(e) of the National
Labor Relations Act8l and that the actions taken by ILA to enforce it were illegal secondary activity under section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of that Act. 82 The Board found a violation and its
83
order was enforced by the Second Circuit.
Critical to the resolution of the Conex case was whether or not
a contract or combination adjudicated to violate section 8(e)'s
prohibition against contracts calling for secondary boycotts can
be within the labor exemption from antitrust liability as part of a
collective bargaining agreement. The court responded in the negative. 84 After tracing the development of the "non-statutory" exemption to the antitrust laws, the court concluded that the key
factor was protection of the mandatory bargaining process. The
protection of this mandatory bargaining process would develop
harmony between labor and antitrust law. Even the plurality in
Jewel Tea was unwilling to grant blanket antitrust immunity for
any agreement regarding mandatory bargaining subjects. Jewel
Tea had found that agreements outside the range of legitimate labor goals necessarily fail in determining the exempt status of an
agreement. 85 Once an agreement is found to violate section 8(e),
it is precluded from antitrust exemptions a fortiori, as national labor policy does not warrant non-enforcement of federal antitrust
policy. Therefore, once the labor agreement is outside section
8(e), the labor exemption is precluded as a matter of law.8 6
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). This section forbids "hot cargo" agreements
whereby an employer agrees to cease dealing with another employer. See note 62
supra.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976). This provision prohibits secondary activity aimed at forcing an employer to cease doing business with another employer. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100, 421
U.S. 616, 641-54 (1975) (Stewart, J. dissenting).
83. International Longshoreman's Ass'n. v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977), reh. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977).
84. 602 F.2d at 512.
85. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965)
(White, J.). See generally Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 83.
86. 602 F.2d at 518. While the narrow holding relates only to § 8(e) violations,

In Conex, the court noted the anticompetitive impact of the
rules and that efforts to enforce them were significant and uncontested.8 7 Thus, the rules and supplement were not exempt under
the Sherman Act. The court further noted that under Connell, the
union activity could clearly be enjoined. Here however, as in
Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Building
Trades Council,88 the employer's action was for money damages
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 89 The court noted that the
purposes of injunctive relief and Clayton Act damages are not one
and the same. 90 The court thus determined that a separate defense should be available when the action was for money damages, because it may be overly harsh to apply the Clayton Act
treble damage sanctions to conduct the parties had a reasonable
basis for believing to be legal. 91 Foreseeability is the touchstone
of this defense; 9 2 the union must show that the illegality was unthere is language in Conex to suggest that the Court would view any unfair labor
practice as sufficient basis for denial of the labor-antitrust exemption. Id.
87. Id. Among factors cited were the upward price pressure caused by the
dockside stripping and stuffing of containers and the foreclosure of any consolidator operating within the Dublin supplement's forbidden "fifty mile rule" zone.
88. 609 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979).
89. 602 F.2d at 495. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
90. The court stated:
Where an action seeks only declaratory or injuctive relief, a finding that
an agreement violates § 8(e) should always remove the antitrust exemption. Once it is clear that a § 8(e) violation has occurred no labor policy is
advanced by permitting ongoing operation of an illegal contract, and injuctive relief pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act is appropriate. In considering the availability of § 4 relief, however, a more refined analysis is
required. For while the agreement which resulted from the collective bargaining process may have been found to be illegal, it is possible that at the
time when the negotiating session took place the parties reasonably believed that their agreement was directly related to the lawful goals of work
preservation. That possiblity raises a labor policy consideration which the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed: the extent to which antitrust exemption should protect not only lawful labor agreements, but also the collective bargaining process. In our view, consideration of the competing
public policies which may be implicated indicates the need to recognize a
limited labor exemption defense to a claim for money damages under the
Clayton Act for conduct which has been held to be illegal under federal
labor law.
602 F.2d at 519-20.
91. Id. at 520-21.
92. 602 F.2d at 521. The court spelled out the foreseeability defense statingThe proper accomodation, we think is recognition, in the collective bargaining context of a defense to § 4 damage recovery involving several elements. Where, as here, a collective bargaining agreement, or conduct
taken pursuant to it, has been shown to be illegal under federal labor law,
a secondary party injured in his business or property by either has made
out a prima facie case under § 4. At that point, to accommodate the labor
policy favoring collective bargaining, the defendants may assert, first, that
at the time they acted (here, the Dublin meeting and later) they could not
reasonably have foreseen that the subject matter of the agreement being
challenged would be held to be unlawful under § 8(b) (4) or § 8(e). If they
fail to prove that the illegality determination was unforeseeable, the defendants should not be exempt from liability for damages under § 4. A
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foreseeable, that the contract provisions are "intimately" related
to the object of collective bargaining, and that the agreement did
not restrain unreasonably secondary markets. The burden of
meeting this test is "formidable," particularly when judicial or administrative proceedings serve to forewarn bargainers that their
agreement may well be entering a proscribed zone. 93 Thus, the
court created an affirmative defense which would shield a union
from liability for actions otherwise proscribed by antitrust laws.
The court concluded by indicating that an agreement found to
violate the antitrust laws as being a group boycott and falling
outside the labor exemption would warrant per se antitrust analysis.9 4 Collateral illegal conduct by the plaintiffs was found to be
95
no defense to liability.
C.

The Muko Decision

Larry V. Muko, Inc. was a non-union general contractor specializing in the construction of fast-food restaurants. 96 In 1973, Long
John Silver's, Inc., a national chain of seafood restaurants, began
development in western Pennsylvania. It hired Muko to construct
successful showing that the determination of illegality was not reasonably
foreseeable is not alone enough to establish an exemption defense, however, for Jewel Tea suggest that the defendants must also demonstrate
that the contract provisions and steps taken to implement them were "intimately related" to the object of collective bargaining thought at the time
to be legitimate, and went no further in imposing restraints in the secondary market than was reasonably necessary to accomplish it.
93. Id. The burden was met in Feather v. UMW, No. 76-955 (W.D. Pa., filed
June 27, 1980), in which section II(g) of the 1974 National Bituminous Coal Workers Agreement was held to violate § 8(e), and the union action taken to enforce it
violated § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The court held the defendant union had carried its burden under Conex foreseeability defense as:
A. The plaintiffs did not allege a "predatory" intent to restrain competition nor was one found by the court. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965);
B. There was no warning, in the form of a judicial or administrative ruling, suggesting the agreement was illegal;
C. The parties reasonably believed the agreement was legal; and
D. Activity undertaken to enforce the agreement went no further than
necessary-to enforce the agreement.
The effect of this test on Muko is uncertain, as the court failed to discuss it in the
opinion reversing a directed verdict.
94. 602 F.2d at 522.
95. Id. at 525. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968).
96. 609 F.2d 1368, 1371 (3d Cir. 1979). As the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict was granted at the end of plaintiff Muko's case, the question of resolving
factual differences never went to a jury. Therefore, the following factual description is based on the facts as a jury might have found them. Id. at 1370.

its first restaurant and subsequently contracted with Muko to
build a second facility in late 1973. During the building of the first
restaurant, the construction site was picketed by representatives
of the Southwestern Pennsylvania Building and Construction
Trades Council. 97 After the restaurant opened, patrons were
given leaflets by Council representatives, asking them to refuse to
patronize Long John Silver's, alleging that the restaurant used
contractors paying less than the prevailing wages for construction
jobs in the area.
Long John Silver's was concerned that picketing at the site of
the second restaurant, construction of which Muko had begun,
would follow from this leaflet activity at the first facility. Restaurant officials proceeded to meet with representatives of the Council in order to curtail Council activity at its restaurants. The
Council representatives indicated that they wanted future Silver's
restaurants built only by union labor. 98 The Council gave the
company representative a copy of the agreement used between
the Council's local unions and union contractors and a list of contractors with whom there were collective agreements in force.
The Council then agreed to curtail leafleting and picketing pending Silver's decision regarding the use of non-union contractors.
Silver's responded in a letter indicating a desire to create a "good
working relationship" with the Council and evidencing an intent
to use only "certified" contractors in the future. 99 It had been Silver's policy to award construction jobs on a competitive basis,
without regard to whether union or non-union labor had been
97. Defendants in Muko were Long John Silver's, Inc., and two labor groups:
the Southwestern Pennsylvania Building and Construction Trades Council, and
the Building and Construction Trades Council of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and vicinity.
98. 609 F.2d at 1371. Muko utilized a construction system whereby its only employees were non-union "supervisors," with most of the actual construction work
done by subcontractors. Neither of the labor defendants indicated any interest in
organizing Muko's employees. Id. at 1372.
99. The letter stated:
I believe that we can serve the same purpose with this letter to show
intent that Long John Silver's, Inc. plans to use only union contractors
certified by the affiliated Building and Construction Trades Councils of
Pittsburgh and Allegheny-Kiski Valley and vicinity. We will also request
that all the investors (property owners) developing for us use union contractors. By operating in this manner, we will accomplish a good working
relationship with you. We have visited several of the contractors, the
names of which we mentioned to you. As soon as we have firm bids on
several construction sites, we will contact you to insure that these contractors are in good standing with the union.
In any relationship between two parties there must be mutual need and
It is ... extremely important to both parties that our loassistance ....
cation at Monroeville, Pennsylvania and the one under construction in
Lower Burrell Township, Pennsylvania not be subjected to any kind of informational picketing.
Id. at 1371. The letter was authored by Silver's vice-president for development.
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used. After this letter to the Council, Silver's asked Muko if it
would use union labor on future projects. Muko refused and was
not asked to bid on the twelve other restaurant projects in western Pennsylvania.10 0 Prior to the meeting between Silver's and
Council's representatives, Muko had been led to believe that,
based on satisfaction with its previous work, it could construct
the remaining restaurants, provided its work quality remained
high and prices remained competitive. Upon completion of the
final twelve facilities by union contractors, the aggregate cost to
Silver's was approximately $250,000 greater than what Muko
would have charged. According to Muko's estimate, a profit would
have been realized at the lower price.101
Muko brought suit against both Silver's and the Council, alleging that Silver's entered into an agreement with the labor organizations whereby Silver's would not award further construction
contracts to contractors who did not have collective bargaining
agreements with either organization1 02 Muko contended that this
violated federal antitrust laws, and sought relief under the Clayton Act. Without written opinion, the trial court granted a defense motion for a directed verdict, apparently on the ground that
there had been no "agreement" as required by section 1 of the
Sherman Act.l03
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af100. Id.
101. Id. at 1372. This calculation makes the "efficient operations" language in
Connell, 421 U.S. at 623, critical in Muko because proof of this profit making ability
would indicate that even if the labor group's activites were arguably exempt, they
may have been fatally overbroad, going beyond the elimination of competition
over wages and conditions of work. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-93 (1965) (White, J.).
102. 609 F.2d at 1370.
103. As Justice Aldisert stated in the panel decision in Muko:
After hearing evidence on the issue of liability, the trial judge granted
defendant-appellees' motions for a directed verdict. The judge rendered
an oral decison. Although he gave no specific reasons for his determination, it appears from one of his statements his decision was based primarily upon his view that the requisite Sherman Act § 1 agreement did not
exist.'
1978-2 Trade Cases 62,184 at 75,293 (1978). Footnote four reads as follows:
4. The trial court stated: "I am so satisfied you haven't made out a case
and it is a management decision, unilateral decision on the part of Long
John Silver's, there is no violation of anything." Trial Transcript at 221.
Appellees' motions to dismiss and for directed verdict alleged numerous
additional grounds, including failure to show injury; failure to show a conspiracy with the purpose and effect to restrain trade; failure to establish
that an unfair labor practice had been committed; failure to establish tortious interference with contract; and protection of the union activity under

firmed, 0 4 basing its decision on what it believed to be fundamental differences between the facts in Connell and those in Muko,
the methods used by the labor group in each case to attain their
goals, and the fact the concessions made by Silver's came as a result of peaceful handbilling protected by both section 7 of the
NLRA and the first amendment. 05
The full court on reargument reversed the panel's decision and
remanded for a new trial.106 The court initially noted that since
the agreement was not embodied in a collective bargaining agreement, the strong labor policy considerations that buttress the
non-statutory exemption were lacking.'0 7 The court focused on
what it discerned to be the test announced in Connell:
We understand Connell to hold, then, that an agreement between a
union and a business organization, outside a collective bargaining relationship, which imposes a direct restraint upon a business market, and
which is not justified by congressional labor policy because it has actual
or potential anticompetitive effects that would not flow naturally from the
is not exelimination of competition over
0 8 wages and working conditions,
empt from antitrust scrutiny

When measured against this standard, the court concluded a jury
could have found the agreement in Muko not to be exempted
from the antitrust laws.109 Further, as there was no common-situs

or collective-bargaining relationship in Muko, the construction in§§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 52. In view of our disposi-

tion of this appeal, it is not necessary to analyze these contentions.
Id. at 75,293 n.4. See generally Suburban Beverage, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462
F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
104. 1978-2 Trade Cases $ 62,184 (1978).
105. Among these differences were the variations in the terms of the agreements: the agreement in Muko required the use of "certified" contractors, and the
agreement in Connell required contractors having collective bargaining agreements with Local 100. Further, a "most favored nation" clause, present in Connell,
was absent in Muko. Additionally, Justice Aldisert saw a fundamental difference
between the "widespread, dominating union action" in Connell and the "limited"
picketing and handbilling in Muko. See 1978-2 Trade Cases at 75,297. Beside the
factual differences, the panel in Muko indicated that the labor group's activities
were within the range of protected actions under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976), and the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Id.
106. 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979).
107. Id. at 1373.
108. Id. This statement raises the questions of whether or not proof of all of
these factors is necessary to defeat a claimed restraint, whether or not the union
must negative each factor, or whether or not the dissent in the en banc rehearing
of Muko is correct in finding that Connell is really confined to a narrower situation
that the majority would believe. 609 F.2d at 1383. Perhaps the most credible reading of this clause is in conjuction with the Supreme Court's opinion in Group Life
Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), reh. denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979),
that all exemptions to antitrust statutes are to be narrowly construed. This would
indicate that the most valid interpretation of this critical language is one that narrows a labor group's ability to claim the exemption to the point that the exemption
is only viable when it is shown that a competitive advantage is achieved solely as
a result of desparate wage and working conditions.
109. 609 F.2d at 1374.
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dustry proviso of NLRA section 8(e), under the Connell formulation, did not apply. Finally, the court declined to rule on whether
a restraint outside of exempt activity, if shown, should be judged
under a per se or rule of reason analysis." 0
Judge Aldisert, in a lone dissent,"' questioned both the result
and the manner in which it was reached. Initially, he perceived
an overbalancing in favor of antitrust concerns, when weighing
competing interest under the Jewel Tea formulation which ex2
empted unilateral union actions in the union's self interest."
Second, he indicated, as he did in authoring the panel decision,
that Muko simply was not Connell revisited, and one could not
simply dispose of the directed verdict in Muko by analogizing
fact-by-fact with Connell. In his mind, the methods utilized by
the Trade Council against Silver's and Larry V. Muko, Inc. were
by no means as pervasive or wideranging as those utilized by Local 100 in Connell, and, in addition, they were federally protected,
3
both constitutionally and by statute."

IV. THE IMPACT OF CONEX AND MUKO
Two basic questions remain open after Connell and the Third
Circuit's Muko and Conex opinions: namely, who must prove or
disprove that the challenged activity falls within the labor exemption to the antitrust laws and by what standard will antitrust liability be adjudged.
A.

Standards of Antitrust Liability in Labor Exemption Cases

While the terms of the Sherman Act are absolute on their
face," 4 over the years the Supreme Court has indicated that not
every activity restraining competition constitutes an antitrust violation. This "exception" to liability arises as a result of differences between those restraints that are violative of antitrust law
110. Id. at 1376. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n., Inc., 602
F.2d 494, 527 (Weis, J. concurring and dissenting), vacated and remanded, 48
U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980).
111. 609 F.2d at 1377.
112. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965).
113. 609 F.2d at 1385. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976);
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976):
§ 1. Restraint of trade; resale price maintenance; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal....

on their face and those that escape liability under an application
of the "Rule of Reason."115
The Court has indicated that only undue or unreasonable restraints on competitive activity are violative of the Sherman
Act. 1 16 The Court, however, has also illustrated situations in
which certain restraining activity is conclusively presumed to be
7
unreasonable and thus violative of antitrust proscriptions.'
118
division of
Among those activities proscribed are price fixing,
markets,

11 9

1
and group boycotts.

20

Alternatively, agreements which do not have only one "necessary effect," have been scrutinized under that standard of the
"Rule of Reason." The Court provided the classic statement of
the factors to be considered in applying this rule:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
may help the
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of12intent
1
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
115. The rule of reason is a shorthand term for a mode of analysis that considers a number of factors in determining if a particular activity works an unreasonable restraint of trade. Such factors include the nature of the agreement, whether
the agreement was intended to restrain completion, and its effect on free market
forces that determine price. See National Soc'y. Professional Eng'rs. v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-98 (1978). See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTrrRusT §§ 65-66
(1977).
116. Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
117. As the Court stated in Northern Pac. R'wy. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958):
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not
only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman
Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint
has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id. at 5. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v.
Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
118. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
119. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
120. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Fashion Originators Guild v. FrC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
121. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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Later cases have added considerations of the percentage of business controlled by the restraining parties, the strength of remaining competition, and whether the actions are triggered by
122
business requirements or a monopolistic intent.
The Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States123 recently illuminated the distinctions between the
per se analysis and the rule of reason by stating:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In
the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed
to establish their illegality-they are "illegal per se." In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by
analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the purpose of the
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the
public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry. Subject
by statute, that policy decision has been made by
to exceptions 12defined
4
the Congress.

It is, therefore, these considerations that govern the application of
antitrust analysis to activities outside the labor exemption.
As the federal courts have attempted to clarify the labor exemption from antitrust laws, the question of the standard by
which non-exempt competitive restraints are to be tested has remained essentially unanswered. 12 5 While the Third Circuit's
holding in Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Association (Conex)126 may have little precedential value, the sharp difference between the majority and the dissent over the application
of a per se analysis serves to illustrate the arguments on each
side of the per se rule of reason question in relation to the labor
exemption.
In Conex, the majority held that in cases raising the specter of
122. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615
(1953).
123. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
124. Id. at 692.
125. See Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. Trades Council, 609 F.2d
1368, 1376 (3d Cir. 1979); Feather v. UMW, No. 76-955 (W.D. Pa., filed June 28, 1980).
126. 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded,48 U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980).
As the Third Circuit and the trial court in Conex may have never reached the per
se rule of reason question without reliance on the collateral estoppel effect of the
order in International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977), reh. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977), the vitality of the
case as a rule of law is questionable. Nevertheless, the opinion does serve to iuminate the state of the labor exemption post-Connell, and to focus the questions
surrounding the proper standard of antitrust analysis when the labor exemption is
lost.

the labor exemption a dual-stage analysis is in order, with initial
focus being on the exemption's applicability and then, and only
then, on the standard of antitrust liability. 27 Using this approach,
the court concluded that the facts in Conex warranted a per se
analysis, as the rules on containers and Dublin supplement constituted a "group boycott."
In addition to using traditional factors to determine that the
necessary effect and nature of the defendant's activities were anticompetitive, the court went further, indicating that when a particular case warrants a finding that the labor exemption is
unavailable, the application of the rule of reason would be redundant.1 28 As Judge Gibbons posited:
The justification offered for application of the rule of reason is the need to
recognize, in the antitrust context, labor's legitimate interest in the collective bargaining process. That interest, however, is precisely the same one
that must be taken into account in determining the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption. A holding that the exemption does not apply embodies a judgment that considerations of labor policy are outweighed by
the anticompetitive dangers posed by the challenged restraint. The proposed use of the rule of reason would, therefore, simply be an invitation to
the court or jury to reweigh under a different label the question of the
non-statutory exemption. The appellees have suggested
no reason why a
1 29
second such inquiry is necessary or appropriate.

In addition, the court noted that to give weight to public interest
considerations, such as those that foster the advancement of the
national labor policy, would be plainly unwarranted in light of the
Supreme Court's warning that the "reason" in the rule goes only
to the impact of the restraint on competition and not to the under30
lying social value of the particular restraining activity.1
The Conex dissent argued that the prevailing mode of antitrust
analysis eschewed the per se approach, 13 1 and indicated that partial overlap of inquiry should not preclude use of the "reasonable127. 602 F.2d at 522.
128. Id. at 523. See Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractor's Ass'n,
579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978); Altemose Const. Co. v. Building & Const. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidated
Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). But see
Kryvoruka, supra note 3, at 81 (rule of reason mandated in labor situation).
129. 602 F.2d at 523-24.
130. Id. As the Court recently reminded:
The Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law precedents long antedating the Sherman Act, has served that purpose. It has been used to
give the Act both flexibility and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has remained constant. Contrary to its name, the Rule does
not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive
conditions.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (emphasis added).
131. 602 F.2d at 528, citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 49 (1977).
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ness" test by labor groups, when noncompetitor boycotts by
religious, racial, or consumer groups are not subjected to per se
liability.132 This dissent, of course, is based on the initial premise
that a labor boycott that is non-exempt falls outside the classic
"group boycott," long proscribed by antitrust decisions interpreting applicable statutes. 133 It is this question that requires the
closest scrutiny in evaluating the standard by which non-exempt
activity is to be judged.
B.

The Group Boycott

The "group boycott" category of per se violations has engendered an unswerving scrutiny on the part of federal courts fearful
of a knee-jerk labelling of activity that may be reasonable, as
measured by its anti-competitive effect. A hallmark of group boy134
cott is a concerted refusal by traders to deal with other traders.
This, however, only begs the question of whether or not the restraint in question is sufficiently analogous to this classic statement to warrant per se disposition. Historically, the group
boycott was personified by a concerted attempt by a group of
competitors at one level to protect themselves from competition
35
from non-group members who seek to compete at that level.1
The key element is exclusion of competition. 136 This raises several significant questions in the labor exemption setting.
Initially, it has been generally recognized that the harmonizing
of labor and antitrust policy mandated by Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader,3 7 United States v. Hutcheson,138 and their progeny recognizes that a legitimate goal of labor unions is the elimination of
competition over wages and working conditions. Keeping this in
mind, it may be that the proper reconciliation of the exemption
policy and the abhorrence of group boycotts harkens back to the
readings of Jewel Tea and Connell exempting only those union
132. 602 F.2d at 528.
133. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). In
Klor's, an agreement between a retailer and several wholesalers prevented sales
to a second retailer on any terms except those which were unfavorable and discriminatory. Id. at 209. See also Altemose Const. Co. v. Building & Const. Trades
Council, 443 F. Supp. 492, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
134. See L. SuLLIvAN,supra note 115, at § 83 (1977). See generally Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
135. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978).
136. 593 F.2d at 1178.
137. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
138. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).

activities within the union's legitimate interest in wages, hours,
and working conditions. This indicates that the union's antitrust
sins were not in their methods, but in their excesses. By going
beyond the legitimate interests of labor groups, wages, and working conditions, the exemption was lost. Therefore, it seems that
the proper rejoinder to a claim that the labor exemption
presumes a certain degree of anticompetitiveness is that activities
within the union's sphere of concerns are not only outside per se
analysis, but beyond antitrust scrutiny. Conversely, once the exemption is lost through overbreadth, traditional group boycott
analysis is warranted.
A second concern is whether or not a Muko-Connell situation
can be within the historically recognized group boycott. At first
blush, the non-exempt agreement may not be between competitors; if it is within this recognized group, it may not work a competitive exclusion.
In Muko, the agreeing parties were Long John Silver's, Inc.,
who purchased contractor services, and the labor groups. While
neither is in horizontal competition with each other, nor is either
a direct competitor of the boycott target, 39 the underlying attribute of a group boycott, the removal of freedom to deal in an open
competitive market, is clearly present 40 The "necessary effect"
of the Muko agreement was to exclude Muko from the market
and it makes little difference that the concerted refusal to deal
was effected on a target having limited economic impact. 141 The
Muko situation is analogous to that in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway
Hale Stores, Inc.142 In the Muko-type situation, the union, via coercive action, prevents the non-union contractor from dealing on
terms other than those which the union has extracted from customers of the contractor's services. In Klor's, the restraining
agreement prevented wholesalers from selling to the target retailer at the prices they chose. In a Muko situation, the purchaser
of services is restrained from buying on its own terms from the
target contractor. This seems to be a difference without distinction, as the net effect is the same: the prevention of entry into the
market on terms other than those specified by the challenged
agreement. Further, it appears that the Court is not willing to restrict the term "boycott" to the so-called "classic" definition,143
139. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 524 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 48 U.S.L.W. (1980) (Conex).
140. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); Mackey
v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 801 (1977).
141. 359 U.S. at 213.
142. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
143. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
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but recognizes the pervasive anti-competitive effect of pressuring
a party with whom one has a dispute by enlisting another to withhold patronage from the target. 144 In light of the foregoing, it
seems evident that a Muko-style agreement is one whose "nature
and necessary effect [is] so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish [its] illegality."145 Therefore, once the exemption for permitted anticompetitive activity of labor groups is lost, the necessary effect of
a Muko-type agreement is to unreasonably restrain trade, hence
triggering a per se analysis.
C.

Burdens of Proofand the Labor Exemption

Two unanswered questions remain after the decisions in Connell, Conex, and Muko: what precisely will a plaintiff have to
prove in order to successfully obtain a damage award in an antitrust suit which may involve the labor exemption, and conversely,
what must a union do to reap the benefits of the exemption?
Feather v. United Mine Workers146 serves as a case study of the
interaction of section 8(e), the Muko reading of the Connell standard and Conex's monetary damage defense.
The Feather case involved efforts by the United Mine Workers
to gain additional employer agreement to the 1974 National Bituminous Coal Workers Agreement 147 (NBCWA) which it had with
the Bituminous Coal Operator's Association (BCOA), an employer's bargaining group.148 One of the clauses in the agreement
provided what the parties believed to be a "work preservation"
provision for coal hauling. 49 The union engaged in strike and
picketing activity to force the plaintiff coal haulers to sign an
144. The Court stated in St. Paul:
The generic concept of boycott refers to a method of pressuring a party
with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the target. The word gained currency in
this country largely as a term of opprobrium to describe certain tactics
employed by parties to labor disputes. Thus it is not surprising that the
term first entered the lexicon of antitrust law in decisions involving attempts by labor unions to encourage third parties to cease or suspend doing business with employers unwilling to permit unionization.
Id. at 541 (citations and footnotes omitted).
145. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
146. Feather v. UMW, No. 76-955 (W.D. Pa., filed June 28, 1980).
147. See id. at 6 for details of that agreement.
148. Feather v. UMW, No. 76-955, at 14 (W.D. Pa., filed June 29, 1980).
149. Id. The clause provided the following:

agreement containing section II(g) of the NBCWA,150 and the
court found that this activity was proscribed by section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the NLRA, as the agreement itself was an illegal
"hot cargo" clause under section 8(e).151
In regard to the plaintiff's antitrust action for .damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act, Judge Knox applied the standards
announced in Conex 152 to determine the applicability of the labor
exemption. Initially, the court in Featherconcluded that the statutory exemption153 was unavailable, as there was concerted activity between the union and the BCOA in agreeing to the offending
clause as part of the collective agreement. 54 In analyzing the
availability of the non-statutory exemption, 155 the court relied on
the Conex interpretation of the Connell standard for claiming the
exemption: "[T] he Connell requirements for antitrust exemption
are, 'first, that the market restraint advance a legitimate labor
goal, and, second, that the agreement restrain trade no more than
is necessary to achieve that goal.' "156
The court in Feather concluded that the agreement in question
failed to meet the first part of this test, as it had been adjudged to
"Article II: Scope and Coverage
Section (g)-Contractingand Subcontracting.
(1) Transportationof Coal-The transportation of coal as defined in paragraph (a) may be contracted out only to a contractor employing members of the UMWA under this Agreement and only where contracting out
such work is consistent with the prior practice and custom of the employer.
(2) Repair and Maintenance Work-Repair and maintenance work customarily performed by classified employees at the mine or central shop
shall not be contracted out except (a) where the work is being performed
by a manufacturer or supplier under warranty or (b) where the employer
does not have the available equipment or regular employees with necessary skills available to perform the work at the mine or central shop, provided, however, that the work at the mine or central shop shall be
performed by UMWA members to the extent and in the manner permitted
by law.
150. Feather v. UMW, No. 76-955, at 17 (W.D. Pa., filed June 28, 1980).
151. Id. at 33.
152. Id. at 29. Upon testing the agreement in question against the Conex foreseeability standard, the court concluded that there was a reasonable belief on the
union's part that the agreement would preserve work rather than acquire it, see
International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. NLRB, 48 U.S.L.W. 4765 (1980), and there
was no indication that the agreement produced § 8(e) or § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) risks.
153. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (White,
J.); Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
154. The hallmark of the statutory exemption is an agreement exclusively between labor groups. A collective bargaining agreement necessarily includes a nonlabor party.
155. See notes 30-33 supra.
156. Feather v. UMW, No. 76-599 at 25 (W.D. Pa., filed June 28, 1980). While this
is a nice condensation of the bottom line in Connell, it is difficult to capsulize
Conex's complicated treatment of the standards for the exemption, and the collateral finding that the traditional labor exemption begets a monetary damage defense in a Clayton Act damage action in one sentence.
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violate section 8(e), as an illegal "hot cargo" clause.157 At this
point the Feather court, in applying the Conex test, becomes
somewhat ambiguous as to the allocation of the various burdens
of proof in a Clayton section 4 action for treble damages.
The ability of labor groups to escape antitrust liability for certain activities has usually been referred to as an "exemption," a
term usually defined as meaning that one is not subject to a certain liability or authority. 158 In Conex however, the court spoke
of the labor exemption, as posited by Jewel Tea and Connell, as a
defense 159 and further framed its newly-defined Clayton section 4
monetary damage defense in the same terms. 160 In Feather the
court, following the circuit's lead, stated that the finding of the
section 8(e) violation removed the first prong of the labor exemption because the market restraint did not advance a legitimate labor goal. As a result, the plaintiff had made out a prima facie
case.161
This possible variance of interpretation of the plaintiffs burden
of proof raises the question of on whose shoulders the proof of applicability or nonapplicability of the exemption falls. In Feather,
it was the court which concluded that the agreement, as to coal
haulers, had a significant anti-competitive effect, 62 yet held there
was no antitrust liability on the union's part. The Conex court
concluded the rules on containers and the Dublin supplement restrained competition, 63 and in Muko the court determined that it
was the jury which could have found an agreement falling within
the language in Connell defining the basis for an antitrust suit
157. Id. at 30. The court also seemed to read Muko as indicating that the only
legitimate labor goal that can permissibly work at market restraint is a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 26. See also Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building Trades
Council, 49 U.S.L.W. 2033 (D. N.J. 1980) (violence and vandalism defeats labor exemption).
158. To release, discharge, waive, relieve from liability. To relieve, excuse, or
set free from a duty or service. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 513 (5th ed. 1979).
159. 602 F.2d at 511, 527.
160. Id. at 521.
161. Feather v. UMW, No. 76-599 at 30, 33 (W.D. Pa., filed June 28, 1980).
162. Id. at 22. "The natural effect of the agreement was to lessen, if not destroy
competition in the coal hauling business." Id. A nice question is whether a per se
analysis would be required on the basis of this statement, had the Conex monetary damage defense been unavailable. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
163. Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 518 (3d Cir.
1979), vacated and remanded, 48 U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980). See notes 84-89 supra and
accompanying text.

against a labor organization.16 4 Viewing each of these decisions
together, it appears that the labor exemption in a damage action
creates a burden of proof that is continually shifting. 165
D.

Agreements Outside the Collective BargainingProcess

The first consideration in the allocation of burdens of proof is
whether or not the alleged agreement is within a collective bargaining relationship. If it is not, then Muko and Connell are controlling. In Connell's crucial formulation, the Supreme Court
stated that an agreement not within a collective bargaining relationship, outside of section 8(e)'s construction industry proviso,
and which has a potential for restraining business market competition in a manner that would not follow naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working conditions would
serve as the basis for a federal antitrust suit.166 In Muko, the
Third Circuit stated that a jury could have found such an agree164. Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. Trades Council, 609 F.2d
1368, 1374 (3d Cir. 1979). The court stated:
On the record before us jury could have found such an agreement. Like
Connell Construction, Silver's purchases the services of building contractors. Like Connell, it has no collective bargaining relationship, actual or
potential, with the Councils or their member locals. As in Connell, the
jury could have found that the defendants entered into an agreement not
to deal with nonunion contractors, which operated as a direct restraint on
the business market by marking those contractors "ineligible to compete
for a portion of the available work." The plaintiff introduced evidence that
this agreement had "substantial [actual] anticompetitive effects"-an increase of more than $250,000 in the total price paid for the twelve restaurants built by union contractors. Finally, the jury could have found that
the agreement between Silver's and the Councils had "a potential for restraining competition in the business market in ways that would not follow natuarally from elimination of competition over wages and working
conditions." For, on plaintiff's evidence, that agreement "indiscriminately
excluded nonunion [contractors] from a portion of the market, even if
their competitive advantages were not derived from substandard wages
and working conditions but rather from more efficient operating methods."
We therefore conclude that the grant of a directed verdict cannot be affirmed on the theory that any agreement which might be found is a matter
of law within the nonstatutory labor exemption.
165. See G. LILLY, EVIDENCE §§ 15-16 (1978). See generally F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE, §§ 7.5, 7.8 (2d ed. 1977). While the term "burden of proof"
refers to the dual burdens of producing evidence and then persuading the factfinder, we will use the term generically to refer to the minimum content of the
plaintiff's primafacie case.
166. Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
635 (1974):
We therefore hold that this agreement, which is outside the context of a
collective-bargaining relationship and not restricted to a particular jobsite,
but which nonetheless obligates Connell to subcontract work only to firms
that have a contract with Local 100, may be the basis of a federal antitrust
suit because it has a potential for restraining competition in the business
market in ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.
This statement is crucial in the sense that the courts in Muko and Feather relied
on this as being the state of the law as to the scope of the nonstatutory exemption.
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ment to be non-exempt; therefore, a directed verdict for the defendant should be reversed. 167 Further on, the Muko court noted
that:
While Connell was decided on the basis of a full trial record, we have
not yet heard the defendant's evidence in this case. Our holding that the
grant of a directed verdict cannot be sustained on the basis of the nonstatutory exemption therefore should not be misconstrued as a holding that
the defendants cannot establish in the court below that they are entitled
to that defense. We hold only that Muko has introduced
evidence suffi16 8
cient to entitle it to have a jury determine that issue.

Taking these statements together along with the Featherformulation, it seems that in a Muko-Connell situation, where the alleged agreement is not in a collective bargaining agreement, a
plaintiff will be required to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
that:
(1)
(2)
(3)

16 9
There was an agreement between labor and non-labor parties;
That the agreement had a potential for restraining the business market; 17 0 and
That the restraint would not flow naturally from
the elimination of
171
competition over wages and working conditions.

Once this is done, the burden shifts to the claimant172 of the labor
exemption, requiring him to go forward with evidence rebutting
any of the above factors. If he can show there was no agreement,
then there is no antitrust violation.173 Additionally, if it can be
shown that there is no restraint of the business market, then the
antitrust policy will not apply under Apex Hosiery.174 Finally, if it
can be shown that the competitive advantage is derived solely
from desparate ways or working conditions of wage competition,
then the Jewel Tea "intimately related" language seems to pre75
clude liability for the restraint.
167. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
168. 609 F.2d at 1375 (emphasis added).
169. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
170. See Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). See also Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (White, J.) (1965).
171. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975).
172. In Muko, both the labor group and Silver's sought the protection of the labor exemption. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) for a discussion of the applicability of the
labor exemption to non-labor parties. See also Clothing and Textile Workers v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
173. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Sherman Act has requirements
for some concerted activity.
174. See notes 20-22 supra. See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (White, J.).
175. 381 U.S. at 689.

If in fact the union can escape the antitrust proscription by negativing any single Connell factor, the labor exemption seems
rather broad, cutting against the Court's command in Group Life
and Health Insurance v. Royal Drug Company176 that antitrust
exemptions should receive a narrow reading. 7 7 If Royal Drug,
rather than Connell, is to be the polestar in defining antitrust exemptions, then conceivably the better course would be to allow
the plaintiff to plead the basic elements of an antitrust case,178
and require the union to plead and prove a statutory or non-statutory exemption as an affirmative defense. 179 Perhaps the courts
view the formulation which places greater burdens on the antitrust plaintiff as being more desirable. It may be that if the plaintiff has the burden, then there is the potential of dismissal at an
earlier point in the litigation process, which serves to diminish
the possibility of using judicial proceedings to hamstring legitimate labor group activity.180
In the final analysis it seems that the antitrust plaintiff will be
required to carry the greater burden. One could view the*cases
since Hutcheson as an elaboration of Justice Stone's statement in
Apex that the aims of the Sherman Act do not include restriction
of certain labor activity. If that is the case, then it is the plaintiff
who must show that any agreement forming the basis of the alleged antitrust claim comes within the purview of the antitrust
laws.'B' In all cases, however, the defendant will still be saddled
with the burden of proof regarding the Conex monetary damage
defense.
E.

Agreements Within the Collective BargainingProcess
For collective bargaining agreements that are alleged to violate
176.

440 U.S. 205 (1979), reh. denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979).

177. Id. at 221. The Court stated, "It is well settled that exemptions from the
antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed."
178. In order to recover damages, the antitrust plaintiff must show both a statutory violation and "fact of damage" from that violation. See Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
179. See 609 F.2d at 1375; 602 F.2d at 511.
180. An example of this is seen in National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-170 (1976). The Act prevents the review of Labor Board election certifications in the courts, but instead requires an employer to refuse to bargain and answer unfair labor practice charges. See R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAw,
§§ 10-11 (1976).
181. 609 F.2d at 1381-82 (Aldisert, J., dissenting):
But having indicated how the line is to be drawn is not to say that judicial precedents fashion an easy test to determine exactly where the axe
must fall. Any test used to make that decision must include a presumption that antitrust law will not normally apply to union activitiy and that
the union is not to be saddled with the burden of proving its activity is
exempt. Rather, the burden of proving non-applicability of the exemption
should fall on the party alleging restraint.
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the antitrust laws, it seems that Jewel Tea, Conex, and Feather,
along with Connell provide the method by which the burdens of
proof are allocated. 82 As a collective bargaining agreement necessarily involves a non-labor party, the statutory exemption is unavailable. The Conex court noted that the non-statutory
exemption is a product of an interpretation of the antitrust laws
which concludes that the policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
do not embrace certain labor activities. If courts are to be true to
Apex and Hutcheson, the plaintiff must be required to show evidence that will indicate that the exemption should not apply in a
given case; that the union was acting outside the scope of its legitimate activities. The Conex court indicates, however, that if the
effect of the agreement was to restrain market competition, thus
removing the "wage uniformity" factor of Apex and Hutcheson,
the proper reading of Jewel Tea and Connell was one that placed
the burden on the defendant to prove that the restraint resulting
from the collective agreement is no broader than necessary to
achieve legitimate union ends.183 If overbroad, the interests are
not properly the subject of union concern, and the market restraint is not one justified by the national policy favoring collective union action. Thus, the activity is within the scope of the
antitrust laws.
F.

Agreements Violating FederalLabor Law

Conex is probably most significant for its conclusion that the labor exemption is unavailable if the collective bargaining agreement is violative of section 8(e).' 84 Conceptually, this makes
sense, as the entire aim of the non-statutory exemption is to protect legitimate labor agreements from antitrust scrutiny. An
agreement which runs contrary to federal labor law is not one advancing legitimate interests.
The simplicity of this method for eliminating the labor exemp182. For examples of varying views on the significance of the collective bargaining relationship, see Landscape Specialties Inc. v. Laborers Int'l Union, 477 F.
Supp. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1979); In re Bullard Contracting Corp., 464 F. Supp. 312
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); Signatory Negotiating Comm. v. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 447 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1978).
183. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 517 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 48 U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980). See also AckermanChillingworth, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484, 503 (9th Cir.
1978) (Hufstedler, J. concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
184. 602 F.2d at 518. See Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union,
553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).

tion can be very appealing to trial courts, as Feather indicates.
Once it is determined that the agreement in question violates section 8(e), antitrust immunity disappears. If this occurs in an injunction action, the district court need not continue to wade
through the conceptually difficult labor exemption area, but can
proceed as if in a "garden variety" antitrust suit. 185 If the action
is one for treble damages, the union will still be without the labor
exemption as developed from Apex through Connell, but will
have an opportunity to prove that it was not "foreseeable" that
the agreement was illegal. Again, the "foreseeability" standard is
a traditional concept in the law, 186 one which trial courts are used
to applying in other settings.
This shortcut to removing the labor exemption has been criticized as allowing the trial courts to decide an area beyond a
court's legitimate domain. In Connell, Justice Powell indicated
that a federal court could "decide labor law questions that emerge
as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal
remedies, including the antitrust laws."'18 7 The Court then proceeded to determine that the agreement entered into with Local
100 was outside section 8(e)'s construction industry proviso. In
Muko, the court of appeals, without explicitly deciding, indicated
that the agreement in question may have violated section 8(e).
The court then declined to comment on the panel's Conex formulation, stating:
Nor do we decide the question whether a finding that an agreement made
outside the collective bargaining context violates § 8(e) by itself removes
The fact that in Connell
labor's nonstatutory antitrust exemption ....
Justice Powell considered the actual and potential anticompetitive effects
of the agreement independently of the § 8(e) issue suggests that the presence of a § 8(e) violation may not itself decide the exemption issue. In
this case, however, as in Connell,there is evidence tending to show both a
market restraint unjustified by the congressional interest in the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions and a violation of
§ 8(e). We therefore need not and do not rule on the effect of a § 8(e) vio188
lation standing alone.

In a footnote to the Muko opinion,18 9 Chief Judge Seitz expressed
185. This is true only to the extent that any antitrust suit under federal law can
be described as "garden variety." See Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494
F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Utility Serv. Eng'r, Inc. v. Colorado Bldg. Trades
Council, 549 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1977); Barabas v. Prudential Lines, 451 F. Supp. 765
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
186.

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 289, 435, 447 (1965).

187. 421 U.S. at 626.
188. 609 F.2d at 1375 (citations omitted).
189. 609 F.2d at 1375 n.1 provides:
1. Chief Judge Seitz -is of the view that the question whether the defendant's agreement is violative of § 8(e) of the NLRA is not presented as
a "collateral issue" in this antitrust action, and need not be decided ....
He notes that the defendants here have not argued, as did the defendants
in Connell, that their agreement was "explicitly allowed by the construction-industry proviso to § 8(e) and that antitrust policy therefore must de-
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a concern that a district court would make the same decision as
the court did in Feather and read Conex and Connell as granting
carte blanche authority to the trial court to make section 8(e) determinations. Perhaps the Conex court interposed its "damageaction defense" in order to soften the impact of the preclusive effect of finding a section 8(e) violation. In any event, the Supreme
Court vacated the Conex case; 190 rather than deciding on the merits, the Supreme Court has delayed an explicit ruling on this significant change in traditional labor exemption analysis.
The varying formulations in Connell, Muko, and Conex serve to
highlight the difficulties accompanying the role of the labor exemption in antitrust litigation and to alert the courts of the need
for a clearer statement of the precise scope of that exemption.
G. Muko On Retrial
An unresolved question is how all of this will affect Muko on retrial. As noted earlier, if the labor exemption is really an exemption rather than an affirmative defense, it is the plaintiff
contractor in Muko who will have to present enough evidence to
allow a jury to find the agreement violates the Connell Court's requirement that such agreements must not be outside the union's
legitimate interests. If Conex's automatic preclusion of the labor
exemption for a section 8(e) violation is still viable doctrine after
Chief Judge Seitz's footnote in Muko, the plaintiff could attempt
to raise a claim that the agreement violates that section, pursuant
to the narrow reading it was given in Connell. 19 1 If a section 8(e)
violation is not shown, the defendants can defeat antitrust liability by negativing any element of the Connell formulation. Should
they be unable to do so, the defendants in a Clayton section 4 action will be permitted to attempt to bury themselves within the
fer to the NLRA." . . . Moreover, he believes that we should not convey
the impression to the district courts that an appropriate short-hand
method of deciding the applicability of the non-statutory exemption in
cases such as this is to determine whether the challenged agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice; such a method would lead to the needless
resolution by the federal courts of significant labor law questions that
ought to be decided in the first instance by the NLRB.
190. 48 U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980).
191. Connell effectively limited § 8(e)'s construciton industry proviso to collective bargaining agreements and common situs situations. 421 U.S. at 633. See
Squillacote v. Racine Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 483 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Wis.
1980), where, in a situation very similar to Muko and Connell, the court granted an
injunction under § 10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1), enjoining activity to enforce an agreement illegal under § 8(e).

multi-pronged defense enunciated in Conex. 192
CONCLUSION

While the opinions in Conex and Muko serve as examples of
the Connell requirement that unions limit their activities to areas
of legitimate interests, they each fail to fill gaps in antitrust doctrine which are vital to lawyers practicing in this area. While
Conex purports to clearly categorize antitrust violations by unions as being per se in nature, the entire court bypassed an opportunity in Muko to definitively adopt that reasoning. Likewise,
Chief Judge Seitz's footnote in Muko may well have been a warning to trial judges and practitioners alike that Judge Gibbons's
wholehearted adoption of a theory that removes the labor exemption upon showing of a section 8(e) violation may have been premature. Finally, the "defense" available to labor unions when an
antitrust suit is one for damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act is logically appealing, but might be little more than an attempt to buffer the sting of the court's denial of the labor exemption for section 8(e) violations. While at least one trial court has
applied it to relieve a union of antitrust liability, review by the
Supreme Court will be necessary before it can become part of the
labor exemption's path of development since Apex Hosiery.
In the final analysis, Muko can best be viewed as the case in
which the outer limits of labor's ability to impair market competition are reached. Muko could build restaurants inexpensively,
not because of low wages and poor working conditions, but because of efficient operation. By refusing to allow labor restraint of
competition based on business acumen, the court in Muko has
taken the labor exemption full-circle, back to Justice Stone's
warning in Apex Hosiery that unions will be beyond the scope of
the antitrust statutes only so long as they affect wages and working conditions, and that infringement of commercial competition
will just as surely subject unions to antitrust liability.

192.

602 F.2d at 519-21.

